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Reasonable Suspicion or a Good Hunch? Dapolito and a 
Return to the Objective Evidence Requirement* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search 
and seizure is a fundamental element of American liberty. Courts 
have long interpreted the amendment as a limit on police officers’ 
ability to detain citizens, mandating that officers could only detain 
citizens through arrests related to completed or ongoing offenses.1 
But this strict application of the Fourth Amendment left officers 
unable to act to prevent crime when faced with suspicious 
circumstances that fell short of an ongoing offense. Judicial 
recognition of the need for additional police authority to prevent 
crime2 first appeared in the Supreme Court case, Terry v. Ohio.3 In 
Terry, the Court held that officers could temporarily detain citizens if 
the officers had reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity may be 
afoot.”4 What came to be known as “Terry stops”5 were initially 
limited; the intermediate police power created in Terry was intended 
as a small accommodation to the practical needs of preventative 
police work and not a significant departure from the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment.6 
However, the Supreme Court has allowed a gradual expansion of 
Terry stops by adopting a deferential stance towards police officers 
and their assertions of what constitutes suspicious behavior.7 The 
Terry Court intended to expand officers’ power to “approach a 
person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even 
 
 *  © 2015 Claire R. O'Brien. 
 1. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.1(d) (5th ed. 2012). 
 2. Id. 
 3. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 4. Id. at 30. 
 5. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 122 (2000) (“[T]he Illinois Supreme 
Court determined that sudden flight in such an area does not create a reasonable suspicion 
justifying a Terry stop.” (citation omitted)). 
 6. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. 
 7. See generally Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-five: A Revisionist View, 74 
MISS. L.J. 423 (2004) (arguing that Terry opened the door for later decisions that exposed 
people in minority neighborhoods to intrusive police investigations); see also Erik Luna, 
Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133, 138 (describing 
the “doctrinal creep-and-crawl” in Fourth Amendment law and the “unmistakable” post-
Terry trend toward greater police power during searches and seizures). 
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though there is no probable cause to make an arrest,”8 but through 
increasing reliance on officers’ subjective determinations, the Court 
has allowed ever-greater police power in this pre-arrest stage. In its 
attempt to accommodate the practical realities of police work, the 
Court has departed from the firm objective evidence requirement for 
reasonable suspicion established in Terry.9 
A recent case out of the First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, 
represents a pushback against this trend. In United States v. 
Dapolito,10 the First Circuit upheld a district court decision to grant a 
motion to suppress evidence.11 Officers found a handgun on the 
defendant during a purported Terry stop, but the district court 
rejected the officers’ claim that they had reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity to justify the stop.12 On appeal, the government 
argued that the district court had inappropriately substituted its 
judgment for that of the officers on the scene.13 In a move away from 
the Supreme Court’s deferential approach to officer testimony in 
Terry cases, the First Circuit approved the lower court’s skeptical 
review of the officers’ justification for the stop.14 By rejecting as 
invalid a police stop that failed to conform to the objective evidence 
requirements laid out in Terry, the First Circuit engaged in a more 
assertive judicial review. The decision constituted an even-handed 
weighing of individual constitutional rights and government claims, 
and represented a return to the balanced judgment exemplified in 
Terry. 
Recent events have sparked a national conversation about the 
scope of police power and the need for greater respect for citizens’ 
rights.15 Similarly, there are signs of increased concern for Fourth 
 
 8. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 
 9. Id. at 21–22. 
 10. 713 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 11. Id. at 143. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Julie Bosman, Outrage and Calls for Change Follow Ferguson Officials 
into Council Meeting, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/us/ 
outrage-and-calls-for-change-follow-ferguson-officials-into-council-meeting.html?_r=0 
(reporting on citizen outrage and calls for “police department overhaul” in the aftermath 
of the police killing of unarmed black citizen Michael Brown); see also David Cole, The 
Outrage of Stop-and-Frisk Policing, NATION (June 14, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/ 
article/168389/outrage-stop-and-frisk-policing# (noting community anger about racially 
targeted stop-and-frisk searches with “little or no suspicion”). 
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Amendment rights within the judicial system.16 Dapolito is not the 
only major ruling in recent years demonstrating an increased 
consideration of citizens’ rights to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure, even at the cost of decreased police efficiency.17 Indeed, 
Dapolito may be part of a developing trend in the field of Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
For example, in United States v. Wurie,18 the First Circuit denied 
police the ability to conduct warrantless searches of digital 
information on cell phones seized from arrested individuals.19 While 
limiting such searches would impede officers’ ability to fight crime, 
the First Circuit weighed the balance in favor of citizens’ privacy 
rights.20 On appeal, the Supreme Court surprised observers by 
affirming the First Circuit.21 Rather than show continued deference to 
police officers in Fourth Amendment situations, the Court upheld 
privacy rights despite the detriment to police efficiency.22 The Court’s 
decision in favor of privacy for cell phone searches may indicate a 
general willingness to return to a more traditional interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment: one that shows less deference to police 
officers and more deference to citizens’ rights to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
This Recent Development argues that Dapolito represents the 
correct approach to Terry stop analysis, just as Wurie was the correct 
 
 16. See Shifting Scales: How the Roberts Court Is Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 
OYEZ http://projects.oyez.org/shifting-scales/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) (noting that the 
Roberts Court has increased the scope of individual privacy). 
 17. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013) (finding that use of a 
drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a home constituted a “search” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes and that police had no implied license to conduct the search); 
United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the government 
violates the Fourth Amendment when it retains computer files seized pursuant to a search 
warrant but not responsive to the warrant); Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 738 F.3d 1058, 
1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that a police officer’s nonconsensual inspection of hotel 
records without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 18. 728 F.3d 1 (2013). 
 19. Id. at 14. 
 20. Id. at 13 (dismissing the government’s argument that cell phone data searches are 
necessary for officer protection and to ensure against data deletion, and finding that the 
scope of private information potentially discoverable in cell phones was too great to allow 
warrantless searches). 
 21. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014); Orin Kerr, The Significance of 
Riley, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/06/25/the-significance-of-riley/ (noting that Riley may be the “tip of 
the iceberg” and wondering after this decision whether “other rules [were] going to 
change”). 
 22. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493. (“We cannot deny that our decision today will have an 
impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime.”). 
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approach to search and seizure analysis. The Court’s return to a 
traditional Terry standard would reduce reliance on subjective 
determinations of police officers, fulfill the Court’s self-described 
“responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing 
or harassing,”23 and be a positive step toward a more balanced 
approach to Fourth Amendment rights. When next presented with a 
Terry case, the Supreme Court should follow the First Circuit’s 
example and reassert a stronger form of judicial review of what 
constitutes sufficient evidence to create reasonable suspicion, thereby 
recalibrating the balance between constitutional rights and police 
accommodations. 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly addresses the legal 
background and facts of Dapolito. This Part discusses both the district 
court’s assessment of the Terry stop of Anthony Dapolito and the 
circuit court’s review of the district court’s holding. Part II explains 
how Dapolito represents a shift away from the analysis the Supreme 
Court has recently applied to Terry cases by contrasting the Supreme 
Court’s deferential approach to officer testimony with Dapolito’s 
more skeptical review. Part III explores relevant policy 
considerations, including racial concerns and the need to protect 
citizens who may not know their rights. Finally, Part IV considers the 
Dapolito decision within the larger context of the resurgence of 
Fourth Amendment protections, with a particular look at the First 
Circuit’s role as a leader in this area of constitutional law. 
I.  FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
The incident that gave rise to United States v. Dapolito24 began 
around 2:00 AM in a public square in Portland, Maine, when two 
patrolling officers noticed a man, the defendant Anthony Dapolito, 
standing alone near an ATM.25 According to the officers, the area had 
recently experienced burglaries, and the defendant was acting 
strangely: he appeared intoxicated and made bizarre facial 
expressions.26 When asked for identification, Dapolito shared his 
name, date of birth, and home state.27 He produced a government 
benefits card matching the name he had provided, but the officers 
were not appeased.28 Because Dapolito misspelled his name the first 
 
 23. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). 
 24. No. 2:12-cr-00045-NT, 2012 WL 3612602, at *7–8 (D. Me. Aug. 21, 2012). 
 25. Id. at *1. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id at *2. 
 28. Id. 
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time he was asked for it, and he therefore did not appear in a search 
of the state license database,29 the officers believed he was a wanted 
person lying about his true identity.30 One officer told Dapolito to 
place his hands on his head, and Dapolito complied.31 During the 
ensuing frisk, the officers found a handgun on his person.32 
Dapolito was subsequently charged with possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon and moved to suppress the handgun as the result 
of an invalid stop.33 Although the officers justified the search by 
claiming that they believed Dapolito was either a would-be burglar or 
a fugitive, the United States District Court for the District of Maine 
dismissed both justifications as unsupported by objective evidence.34 
The court relied on Terry law to determine whether the police had 
adequate reason to stop and frisk the defendant. Through a skeptical 
analysis of the officers’ justification for the stop, the court found their 
explanation lacking and granted the motion to suppress.35 The court 
held that the mere fact that Dapolito came across as “odd” was 
insufficient to create reasonable suspicion and that “[t]he Defendant 
was acting not unlike many other members of the indigent and/or 
transient population of Portland.”36 The district court was 
unimpressed by the officers’ insistence that they had a “police sense 
that something wasn’t right”37 and countered: “The Court calls it a 
good hunch.”38 
The district court similarly rejected the officers’ contention that 
they suspected Dapolito of involvement in a burglary, noting that 
neither officer could specify a recent burglary that had taken place in 
the area, nor could either officer point to burglary tools on or near 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at *7. The district court refused to infer that Dapolito deliberately misspelled 
his name, pointing to the fact that he spelled it correctly the second time. Id. at *8. Instead, 
the court concluded that Dapolito either misspelled his name unintentionally or that the 
officer simply misheard him. Id.  
 31. Id. at *3. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at *9. 
 34. Id. at *7–8 (“The police articulated no other suspicion than generalized suspicion 
and unsupported suspicions of burglary and an outstanding warrant. The officers observed 
no criminal behavior and had no tips or sources of information notifying them that the 
Defendant was engaging in any other crime. The officers saw no contraband and no 
indication of a weapon.”).  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at *7. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. Note that by “a good hunch,” the Court seems to mean a hunch that ultimately 
led to incriminating evidence (in this case, a gun).  
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Dapolito.39 Finally, the court denied the officers’ claim that they 
believed Dapolito was a fugitive and was lying about his true 
identity.40 The court held that the officers did not have a 
“particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the Defendant 
was wanted on an outstanding warrant” because the officers had 
received no tip that Dapolito was a wanted person and because their 
suspicion was primarily based on the fact that his name did not 
appear in the state license database.41 
On appeal, the government asserted that the district court had 
inappropriately rejected the officers’ testimony that the defendant’s 
location and behavior created reasonable suspicion and that the 
review therefore misapplied the reasonable suspicion test for Terry 
stops.42 The First Circuit rejected the government’s argument and 
affirmed the lower court, finding that the district court’s skeptical 
review of the officers’ justification for the stop was appropriate.43 In 
fact, the First Circuit held that the district court did not need to 
“defer to these specific police officers’ view of the situation” to assess 
whether reasonable suspicion existed44 and affirmed the district 
court’s determination that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to 
make a Terry stop.45 By upholding the district court’s assertive review, 
the First Circuit departed from the Supreme Court precedent in Terry 
stop cases and displayed a more balanced approach to the reasonable 
suspicion analysis. 
II.  THE DAPOLITO COURT’S46 RETURN TO A FIRM OBJECTIVE 
EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT 
The Supreme Court originally intended Terry stops as minor 
concessions to the practical need for police to take pre-arrest action 
to stop crime and protect themselves.47 The Supreme Court expanded 
the ability of the police to stop citizens, even in the absence of 
 
 39. Id. (“Other than standing near an ATM, the Defendant was doing nothing that 
suggested that he had committed or was going to commit a burglary.”). 
 40. Id. (noting that the officers had “scant evidence to support their suspicions” that 
Dapolito was lying about his identity). 
 41. Id. at *8. 
 42. United States v. Dapolito, 713 F.3d 141, 143 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 43. Id. at 149. 
 44. Id. at 150. 
 45. Id. at 153. 
 46. Throughout this paper, “the Dapolito court” refers to the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and not the United States District Court for the District of Maine. 
 47. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (“We cannot blind ourselves to the need for 
law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence 
in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest.”). 
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probable cause but only in certain limited circumstances. Terry 
required that police officers use the facts available to them at the 
moment of the stop to determine if a person of reasonable caution 
would believe that the action taken was appropriate.48 Part of the 
problem with this standard is that “reasonable” is not a self-defining 
term. Rather, it is a flexible guideline that can shift depending on the 
weight a court gives to Fourth Amendment rights or the practical 
needs of law enforcement. By setting a firm objective evidence 
requirement, the Terry Court indicated that it intended Terry stops to 
be only a small accommodation to police and that courts should not 
show disproportionate deference to either the citizen’s constitutional 
claims or the police officer’s testimony.49 The Supreme Court 
explained this balancing act several years after Terry: “ ‘Fidelity’ to 
the commands of the Constitution suggests balanced judgment rather 
than exhortation. . . . The task of this Court, as of other courts, is to 
‘hold the balance true . . . .’ ”50 In its post-Terry decisions, however, 
the Supreme Court moved away from a balanced approach and 
showed increased deference to police officers through a less stringent 
application of the objective evidence requirement. The First Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Dapolito is therefore significant because it 
reflects a judicial return to Terry’s original objective evidence 
standard. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Shift Away from Terry 
Terry v. Ohio represented the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
an overly strict application of the Fourth Amendment to police arrest 
power led to undesirable results. The Supreme Court noted that 
limiting the police arrest power to ongoing crime or past crime could 
“exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent 
crime,”51 and created a doctrine that broadened the types of situations 
in which the police could stop and investigate citizens. The Court also 
balanced the practical need for a “set of flexible responses”52 for 
 
 48. Id. at 22. 
 49. Id. at 24 (acknowledging the physical risks for police officers in a situation where 
the officer lacks probable cause for an arrest but concluding that the court “must still 
consider, however, the nature and quality of the intrusion on individual rights”). 
 50. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983) (“The highest ‘fidelity’ is achieved 
neither by the judge who instinctively goes furthest in upholding even the most bizarre 
claim of individual constitutional rights, any more than it is achieved by a judge who 
instinctively goes furthest in accepting the most restrictive claims of governmental 
authorities.”). 
 51. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. 
 52. Id. at 10. 
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police officers with the constitutional requirements of Fourth 
Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.53 
Although the Court held that officers could make pre-arrest stops, it 
limited that power by stating: “[I]t is imperative that the facts be 
judged against an objective standard. . . . [S]imple good faith on the 
part of the arresting officer is not enough.”54 The Court emphasized 
that at the moment of seizure or search, a reasonable person would 
have to believe that the action was appropriate and warned that any 
lesser standard would cause the Fourth Amendment to “evaporate,” 
exposing citizens to unreasonable search and seizure at the whim of 
police.55 Indeed, the Court even discussed the importance of 
maintaining the integrity of the objective evidence requirement, 
noting that “[a]nything less would invite intrusions upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial 
than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused 
to sanction.”56 Thus, Terry was only intended to grant police officers a 
limited pre-arrest power and to permit a minor weakening of Fourth 
Amendment protections to accomplish the practical goal of 
preventative police work and ensure officer safety.57 
In subsequent decisions, the Court has paid lip service to Terry58 
but has gradually expanded what constitutes permissible police action 
by showing increasing deference to police testimony of what 
constitutes suspicious behavior. In Illinois v. Wardlow,59 for example, 
the Court accepted the officers’ justification that they suspected the 
defendant was engaged in criminal activity based on his presence in a 
high-crime area and what the officers interpreted as his “unprovoked 
flight.”60 
The Wardlow decision highlighted the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Terry in favor of police and at the expense of Fourth 
 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 54. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22. 
 55. See id. at 22. (“If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (describing the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard set forth in Terry); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002) 
(rejecting a lower court’s approach to determining the existence of reasonable suspicion 
for failing to take into account the totality of the circumstances and holding that the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was engaged in criminal 
activity). 
 59. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 60. Id. at 124. 
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Amendment rights. In its explanation of its approval of the officers’ 
stop, the Court noted, “Terry recognized that officers can detain 
individuals to resolve ambiguities in their conduct, and thus accepts 
the risk that officers may stop innocent people.”61 The Court gave 
great weight to the officers’ testimony that the incident occurred in 
“an area well known for heavy narcotics trafficking”62 and demanded 
no explanation of the size of the area identified or the frequency of 
crimes in the area.63 
The Court showed further deference to police officers by 
agreeing with the government’s argument that a citizen running away 
from officers justified reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
despite the existence of many nonsuspicious reasons why a person 
might break into a run (such as trying to make it home in time for 
dinner or to catch a bus).64 The Court held that “[h]eadlong 
flight . . . is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily 
indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”65 The 
officers failed to provide much evidence for suspicion other than the 
defendant’s flight and his presence in a high crime area.66 The stop 
occurred in the middle of the day, and the officers were not 
responding to a report of suspicious activity in the area.67 Even so, the 
Court upheld the search.68 This heavy reliance on flight as a factor 
contributing to reasonable suspicion contradicted the established rule 
that a citizen has the “right to ignore the police and go about his 
business.”69 Under this expansive view of what constitutes suspicious 
conduct, a citizen who simply walked away from an approaching 
police officer might be seen as acting in an evasive manner sufficiently 
suspicious to justify a Terry stop.70 Thus, the Wardlow decision greatly 
 
 61. Id. at 120. 
 62. See id. at 124. 
 63. Id. at 121 (stating that respondent Wardlow was in an area known for heavy 
narcotics trafficking, with no further discussion of whether or not the area was indeed high 
crime); see also id. at 122 (noting that the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that 
Wardlow was not in a high crime area, but not delving into the question itself). 
 64. Id. at 129 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 65. Id. at 124 (majority opinion). 
 66. Id. at 137–139 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that 
the “terse” police report was “most noticeable for what it fails to reveal” and that the 
appellate court found the record “ ‘too vague to support the inference that . . . defendant’s 
flight was related to his expectation of police focus on him’ ”). 
 67. Although the defendant was carrying a white, opaque bag under his arm, the 
dissent noted that “there is nothing at all suspicious about that.” Id. at 139. 
 68. Id. at 121 (majority opinion). 
 69. Id. at 120. 
 70. At least one court has already extended the Court’s holding. See United States v. 
Bumpers, 705 F.3d 168, 177 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that where an individual walked 
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increased the number of circumstances in which an officer could claim 
reasonable suspicion and showed a continued preference for the 
practical needs of police work over the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.71 
The Supreme Court’s continued preference for practicality over 
privacy was highlighted in Maryland v. King,72 a recent Fourth 
Amendment decision focused on police collection of citizen DNA. 
Although King concerned the scope of permissible police action after 
an arrest (as opposed to the pre-arrest considerations of a Terry stop), 
the holding highlights the Court’s willingness to allow decreased 
privacy for citizens in the name of efficient crime prevention.73 The 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not bar police from 
swabbing the inside of an arrestee’s cheek to acquire his DNA,74 
finding that the diminished expectations of privacy inherent in an 
arrest justified the “minor intrusion” to the human body and that any 
indignity the arrestee might suffer was counterbalanced by the 
“significant state interest[]” in the identification of arrestees.75 As in 
the earlier post-Terry cases, the Court’s concern for the practical 
needs of police work in King exceeded its concern for citizens’ privacy 
rights. This attitude reflects the Court’s gradual shift away from 
stringent Fourth Amendment protections in the decades since Terry.76 
 
quickly away from a police officer in a high-crime area, such behavior supported a 
reasonable suspicion determination). 
 71. This preference may also be seen in the Court’s refusal to require a “knowing and 
intelligent” waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 241 (1973). Additionally, the Court’s acceptance of testimony about “furtive gestures” 
to support an officer’s reasonable suspicion shows a tilt away from the objective evidence 
requirement. The “furtive gestures” phrase can be used to characterize a wide range of 
activity and can be used to support a claim of reasonable suspicion even when an officer 
never actually sees a suspicious object and has no other reason to suspect a citizen of 
unlawful activity. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 3.6(d) (5th ed. 2012); see also People v. 
Superior Court, 478 P.2d 449, 455 (Cal. 1970) (“[I]f words are not infrequently ambiguous, 
gestures are even more so. Many are wholly nonspecific, and can be assigned a meaning 
only in their context. Yet the observer may view that context quite otherwise from the 
actor: not only is his vantage point different, he may even have approached the scene with 
a preconceived notion—consciously or unconsciously—of what gestures he expected to 
see and what he expected them to mean.”). 
 72. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 73. Id. at 1962 (explaining that the defendant was arrested and taken to a facility 
where booking personnel used a cheek swab to take a sample of his DNA). 
 74. Id. at 1980. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615–16 (2007) 
(denying citizens redress for a mistaken search in which the police held the citizens at 
gunpoint, naked; the Court stated that that innocent people may “bear the cost” of valid 
searches, and casually accepted that “the resulting frustration, embarrassment, and 
humiliation may be real”); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (holding that while 
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B. The First Circuit’s Return to the Objective Evidence Requirement 
Unlike the Supreme Court decisions of recent decades, the First 
Circuit’s Dapolito decision gave precedence to citizens’ privacy rights 
over police practicality. The First Circuit rejected evidence acquired 
in a police stop because the officers were unable to provide sufficient 
objective evidence to support their claim of reasonable suspicion.77 
This demanding review of officer testimony represents a pushback 
against the Supreme Court’s Terry law trend. In contrast to the 
Supreme Court’s passive review of police determinations in Wardlow, 
and its deference to state interests in King, the Dapolito court held 
that a court need not “defer to . . . specific police officers’ view of the 
situation, and cast aside its individual judgment about what an 
objective officer’s view would be.”78 Instead, the First Circuit 
reviewed the officers’ testimony that they were suspicious of Dapolito 
with great skepticism.79 By treating pre-arrest stops as a limited grant 
 
an overnight guest may have Fourth Amendment protections in someone else’s home, one 
who is merely present for a short amount of time does not); California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (allowing a search of defendant’s garbage on the grounds that 
knowing possibility of exposure to a third party, even in one’s own home or office, negates 
any Fourth Amendment claim); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (holding 
that officers’ observations made from public airspace as they flew over the home of a 
citizen suspected of growing marijuana were not a violation of the Fourth Amendment); 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (finding that a protective search of a 
passenger compartment of a motor vehicle is permissible during a Terry stop); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (finding that installation of a register to record 
numbers dialed from the telephone at a defendant’s home did not constitute a “search” 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 
(1972) (holding that reasonable cause for stop and frisk need not be based on an officer’s 
personal observation and that a tip from an informant could suffice). For further 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s evolving approach to the Fourth Amendment, see The 
Supreme Court, 1992 Term – Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 171 n.59 (1993) 
(“Since Terry, the Court has gradually expanded the circumstances that justify a stop and 
frisk . . . .”). The article finds support for its statement from the dissent in Michigan v. 
Long, in which Justice Brennan protested that the Court was “distorting Terry beyond 
recognition.” 463 U.S. at 1054; see also Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The 
War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 886 
(2001) (“[T]he Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence since Terry represents an 
increasingly explicit effort to tap the full potential of possession as a general policing tool. 
With remarkable frequency, the Court has found ways to legitimize possession searches 
and seizures in an ever increasing variety of circumstances.”); 4 LAFAVE, supra note 1, 
§ 9.2(d) (noting an expansion of Terry and a trend granting greater scope of officers’ use of 
force during investigatory detentions).  
 77. United States v. Dapolito, 713 F.3d 141, 143 (1st Cir. 2013) (upholding the district 
court’s determination that the police officers did not have sufficient objective evidence to 
justify their search of defendant Dapolito). 
 78. Id. at 150. 
 79. See id. at 151–52 (rejecting the government’s assertion that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion by pointing out that the officers did not observe Dapolito engaging in 
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of authority that officers must justify with objective evidence, the 
court’s analysis aligned with the standard set in Terry: pre-arrest 
police action is appropriate only when the “facts available to the 
officer at the moment of seizure . . . ‘warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate.”80 The 
Court created this standard to prevent intrusions on individuals’ 
Fourth Amendment rights based on “nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches”81 and intended the resulting analysis to reflect 
an even-handed consideration of citizen’s constitutional rights and 
officer’s testimony. Despite the trend of Terry law in favor of a more 
deferential approach to officer testimony, the First Circuit returned to 
the classic Terry objective evidence requirement with its decision in 
Dapolito. 
The Dapolito decision reflected a Terry-style analysis in its 
application of the requirement that intrusions on citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment rights be based on more substantial support than what 
Terry defined as “inarticulate hunches.”82 Rather than rely on the 
word of the specific officers in the case, the First Circuit held that the 
district court was correct to view the situation “through the lens of a 
reasonable police officer.”83 The court elaborated: “[T]o the extent 
the government argues the district court needed to . . . cast aside its 
individual judgment about what an objective officer’s view would be, 
that is not the law.”84 It affirmed the lower court’s holding that 
because the officers in this case had neither tips85 nor visual evidence86 
suggesting that Dapolito was involved in criminal activity, their 
suspicions were not sufficiently “particularized and objective”87 to 
 
questionable behavior such as “fiddling with doorways,” that Dapolito readily provided 
his personal information to the officers and engaged in conversation with them, and that 
there was no outstanding warrant matching Dapolito’s name or appearance). 
 80. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 162 (1925)). 
 81. Id. at 22. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Dapolito, 713 F.3d at 148. 
 84. Id. at 152. 
 85. Compare id. at 151 (emphasizing that the officers had been given no information 
on any individual’s wanted status), with United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 222 (1985) 
(holding that if police are acting off information from a “wanted flyer,” that fact will 
justify a Terry stop). 
 86. Compare Dapolito, 713 F.3d at 151 (noting that Dapolito had no tools to 
burglarize, such as pliers or a pry bar), with Terry, 392 U.S. at 23 (finding it suspicious that 
a person would pace back and forth in front of a store twenty-four times and then 
conference with two other men). 
 87. United States v. Dapolito, No. 2:12-cr-00045-NT, 2012 WL 3612602, at *8 (D. Me. 
Aug. 21, 2012). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2015) 
2015] REASONABLE SUSPICION IN DAPOLITO 1177 
constitute reasonable suspicion.88 To the Dapolito court, even the fact 
that Dapolito was “grimacing, squinting, and making strange facial 
expressions”89 was not enough to create reasonable suspicion in the 
absence of behavior specifically suggesting criminal activity, such as 
casing a building or holding burglary tools.90 When the officers 
testified that they suspected Dapolito was a fugitive because the name 
he provided did not appear in the state license database, the court 
dismissed the suggestion outright: “It simply cannot be that 
reasonable suspicion of a person being a wanted fugitive is created by 
the failure to find the name, given by the person, in a government 
database.”91 The Dapolito court thus engaged in a more forceful 
review than the Supreme Court has applied in similar Terry stop 
cases92 and gave less weight to officers’ testimony when considering 
what constitutes reasonable suspicion.93 
Additionally, the First Circuit showed that it was not afraid of 
charges of “unrealistic second-guessing.”94 The First Circuit turned 
away from a deferential review of police behavior and ignored 
Supreme Court warnings that “[a] creative judge engaged in post hoc 
evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some 
alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have 
been accomplished.”95 It engaged in assertive judicial review by 
critically assessing officer testimony that Dapolito was in a “high 
crime area” where burglaries had recently occurred.96 The court 
noted that the downtown area the officers identified was in fact a 
large area comprising many streets.97 This nuanced consideration of 
 
 88. Dapolito, 713 F.3d at 153. 
 89. Id. at 144. 
 90. Id. at 151. 
 91. Id. at 152. 
 92. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (holding that running away from 
police is conduct sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion); Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 441 (1991) (refusing to recognize coercive police action even when police stood 
over a bus passenger and asked him intimidating questions); United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 571–72 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for finding 
reasonable suspicion when officers approached the defendant based only on their visual 
observations, as opposed to specific tips). 
 93. The dissent criticized this analysis and accused the majority of “picking out the 
suspicious factors one-by-one and offering an innocent explanation for each,” thereby 
failing to consider how suspicious Dapolito’s behavior was in context. See Dapolito, 713 
F.3d at 157 (Howard, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 822 
(1st Cir. 2011)). 
 94. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). 
 95. Id. at 686–87. 
 96. Dapolito, 713 F.3d at 151. 
 97. Id. 
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what an officer meant by “high crime area” is a clear departure from 
cases in which the Supreme Court accepted without question officers’ 
assertions that an area was “high crime.”98 Because there was no 
evidence that the square in which the defendant stood was a 
“particular hot spot,” nor evidence as to what the officers meant by 
“recent,”99 the court was unconvinced by the claim that the officers 
had reason to suspect Dapolito based on his location.100 Thus, the 
First Circuit engaged in a nondeferential review of the officers’ 
testimony and took a positive step back toward the balance between 
Fourth Amendment rights and police efficiency so carefully set in 
Terry. 
III.  DAPOLITO IS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR FOURTH 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Strong policy considerations support the argument in favor of a 
more assertive judicial review of police power on Fourth Amendment 
issues. Dissenting voices on the Supreme Court have repeatedly 
pointed to the risks of judicial failure to restrict police power to 
intrude on citizens’ lives.101 For example, in the Wardlow dissent, 
Justice Stevens stated that minority citizens are often the victims of 
racial bias in subjective police assessments of suspicious behavior102 
and noted that such unequal treatment caused fear, anger, and 
 
 98. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000) (accepting without question the 
officers’ assertion that the area was “known for heavy narcotics trafficking”); United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (1980) (accepting without question the 
government’s assertion that the defendant was suspicious partially due to the origin of her 
airline flight). For further discussion of the questionable use of the “high-crime area” label 
to support reasonable suspicion, see Hannah Rose Wisniewski, It’s Time to Define High-
Crime: Using Statistics in Court to Support an Officer’s Subjective “High-Crime Area” 
Designation, 38 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 101, 102–04 (2012) 
(critiquing the idea of “guilt[] by location” and arguing that in today’s high-tech world, a 
defendant arrested in an allegedly high-crime area should be able to demand statistical 
evidence as objective support for the arresting officer’s subjective assessment); see also 
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (2001) (Kozinski, J., concurring) 
(“Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem as a nail, so a man with a badge may 
see every corner of his beat as a high crime area.” (citing Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 
1247 (9th Cir. 2000))).  
 99. Dapolito, 713 F.3d at 151. 
 100. Id. at 153. 
 101. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“The thought that an American can be compelled to ‘show his papers’ before exercising 
his right to walk the streets . . . is repugnant to American institutions and ideals.” (quoting 
State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d 992, 997 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc) (Feldman, 
J., concurring))).  
 102. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 133 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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mistrust toward the police among minority citizens.103 Recent events 
in Ferguson, Missouri, and New York City104 highlight the fact that 
racial tensions between citizens and police are as serious a 
consideration today as when Justice Stevens expressed his concerns 
nearly a decade ago and suggest a need for greater skepticism toward 
police assessments of “suspicious” behavior. Indeed, the risks of 
reliance on police assessments of what constitutes reasonable 
suspicion are highlighted by the wide variety of behaviors that officers 
have used to justify their suspicions. For instance, staring too long at 
officers and avoiding eye contact with officers have both been 
proposed as support for reasonable suspicion.105 The risks of racial 
bias and government overreach underline the importance of a 
stringent application of the objective Terry standard and highlight the 
need for more decisions like Dapolito. 
It is tempting for courts to defer to police judgments about what 
is necessary for good police work based on the belief that those 
judgments are rooted in years of street experience. Indeed, police 
officers often do have a knowledge base that allows them to assess a 
situation more judiciously than the average citizen.106 But a skeptical 
judicial review that demands the presence of objective evidence to 
support reasonable suspicion better protects the Fourth Amendment 
for all citizens by guarding against biased stops of minority citizens.107 
 
 103. See id. at 133 n.10. 
 104. See Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-
after-police-shooting.html?_r=0 (last updated Nov. 25, 2014) (explaining the community 
uproar after a police officer shot and killed unarmed teenager Michael Brown and noting 
that a civil rights inquiry was opened due to allegations that the shooting was racially 
motivated); Editorial, It Wasn’t Just the Chokehold: Eric Garner, Daniel Pantaleo and 
Lethal Police Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/ 
opinion/eric-garner-daniel-pantaleo-and-lethal-police-tactics.html (demanding “major 
changes in policy” after the death of black citizen Eric Garner, who died as police put him 
in a chokehold, and describing the public fury surrounding Garner’s death).  
 105. See Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicions and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
407, 437 (2006); see, e.g., United States v. West, 103 F. App’x. 460, 462 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(noting the fact that defendants “repeatedly stared” at officers as contributing to a totality 
of circumstances that supported a finding of reasonable suspicion); State v. Jackson, 892 
So. 2d 71, 76 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (finding an officer justified in requesting that the 
defendant remove his hands from his pockets and present identification after defendant 
“refused to make eye contact,” among other nervous behaviors).  
 106. A simple example would be that an officer might recognize code words or gang 
symbols to a greater degree than would an inexperienced layman. Terry itself recognized 
that an officer determines whether criminal activity is afoot “in light of his experience.” 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 107. This is especially true considering criticisms of the accuracy of police hunches: 
some have suggested that officers are “deluding themselves as to their powers of 
observation” when they claim to be able to “distinguish between ordinary nervousness and 
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When police officers know they must present objective evidence in 
court, they may be less likely to rely on potentially racially motivated 
hunches to justify Terry stops.108  
Additionally, restrictions on pre-arrest police power are 
beneficial because many citizens do not know their Fourth 
Amendment rights.109 If the courts do not enforce the constitutional 
limitations on police power, the police may freely commit Fourth 
Amendment violations.110 As one scholar noted, “The basic right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is, for most people, 
either unknown or fuzzy in the extreme.”111 The Terry Court 
considered this fact when it demanded objective evidence from police 
officers, holding that the “major thrust” of the Fourth Amendment is 
to deter improper police misconduct by excluding unlawfully seized 
evidence.112 The knowledge that any evidence gathered during an 
invalid stop will be useless in a subsequent criminal case may deter 
officers from making an invalid stop in the first place. This deterrent 
role is especially powerful in light of the fact that an innocent citizen 
who is subject to an unlawful Terry stop will very rarely have the 
opportunity to vindicate his rights. Standing problems will challenge 
 
suspicious nervousness.” Lerner, supra note 105, at 437. Subjective assessments may often 
be driven by bias, although such bias may not necessarily be intentional. Police officers, 
like everyone else, may be susceptible to making unconscious race-based assessments. See 
MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF 
GOOD PEOPLE, at xii (2013) (describing how implicit bias can affect behavior). In the 
context of pre-arrest stops, such implicit bias means that departure from an objective 
standard could lead to a disproportionate number of stops of minority citizens. But see Pat 
J. Merriman, Consent Searches and the Narcotics Offender, 49 J. MO. B. 479, 480–81 (1993) 
(explaining that officers’ decisions to stop suspects based on criteria rather than 
observation of suspicious activity are rooted in “background, training, and work 
experience” that allow the officers to identify “common indicators” for certain types of 
criminality). For an officer’s perspective on the power of hunches, see Dan Horan, A 
Hunch, or the Whispered Voice of Experience?, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 13, 13–15 (2007) 
(describing his own experience stopping a suspect based on an accurate hunch, including 
his reliance on “visual clues” that were “surely overlooked” by non-officers).  
 108. For a discussion of racially motivated police stops and the necessity of stronger 
judicial rules to deter such stops, see generally Brooks Holland, Racial Profiling and a 
Punitive Exclusionary Rule, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 29 (2010). 
 109. See Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The 
Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter 
Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 527 (2001) (“It is highly unlikely that the average 
citizen, or reasonable person, is aware of the notion of consensual encounters with police, 
let alone the doctrine’s parameters. To begin with, citizens’ awareness of even the broad 
outlines of their constitutional rights is severely limited.”). 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S 1, 12 (1968). 
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the more ambitious suits,113 and even in a best-case scenario, a citizen 
would have to expend a great deal of time and financial resources for 
a simple civil judgment.114 
Two counterarguments weigh against limiting police power in 
favor of Fourth Amendment considerations. First, increased 
limitations on police power may hinder police efforts to prevent 
crime. The fear of hampering preventative crime efforts is especially 
potent in our modern era, where the realities of high-impact weapons 
and terrorist activity mean that “a good hunch”115 could be the 
difference between life and death for hundreds of people. The dissent 
in Dapolito noted that Terry stops are meant to clarify ambiguous 
situations and concluded that when the police believe there is 
“concrete cause for concern,” they should have the power to act.116 
Second, limiting police power may prevent officers from 
discovering weapons and thereby expose officers to physical harm. 
Judges, sitting in the security of their chambers, hesitate to limit the 
ability of officers on the street to protect themselves.117 Fear of this 
“unreasonable” notion was originally expressed in Terry, when the 
Court stated: “[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law 
 
 113. See Matthew McKnight, The Stop-and-Frisk Challenge, NEW YORKER (Mar. 27, 
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-stop-and-frisk-challenge (explaining 
the heightened standing requirements for plaintiffs who seek to use the court system to 
change police tactics, as opposed to simply seeking a money judgment); see, e.g., City of 
Los Angles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (applying a higher standing threshold for 
anyone who uses the court system to attempt to force a change in police tactics where the 
plaintiff fails to “establish a real and immediate threat” that such harmful police tactics 
would be used against plaintiff in the future).  
 114. Consider the experience of Mandrel Stuart, who was detained without charges 
after a routine traffic stop for overly tinted windows. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., They 
Fought the Law. Who Won?, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/sf/investigative/2014/09/08/they-fought-the-law-who-won. The officer on the scene seized 
$32,934, and Stuart spent $9,000 in legal fees to negotiate a government deal for a return 
of half the money. Id. Stuart ultimately recovered only $7,000 of the $32,934. Id. For an 
example of the extended length of time a citizen must commit to a wrongful arrest suit, 
see, for example, Burr v. Burns, 439 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782–84, 793 (2006). In Burns, the 
progression of plaintiffs’ suit is tracked from the time of their thirty-two-hour detention in 
2004 to their initial filing of a wrongful-arrest suit, removal of the suit to a different 
location, the partial granting of defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the subsequent motion 
to dismiss on the remaining claims before the district court. Id. The district court ordered 
that the case “be set for trial as soon as practicable”—a full two years after the original 
incident. Id. 
 115. See United States v. Dapolito, No. 2:12-cr-00045-NT, 2012 WL 3612602, at *7 (D. 
Me. Aug. 21, 2012). 
 116. United States v. Dapolito, 713 F.3d 141, 159 (1st Cir. 2013) (Howard, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 117. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 23 (1968) (“[E]very year in this country many law 
enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded.”). 
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enforcement officers to protect themselves.”118 The Supreme Court’s 
caution against “unrealistic second-guessing”119 is recognition of the 
fact that the police operate in a unique and often dangerous 
environment, and must often make challenging decisions to protect 
themselves and bystanders. However, by limiting the extent to which 
officers’ subjective assessments will be accepted as support for 
reasonable suspicion, the Dapolito court did not deprive officers of all 
their power. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent against 
suspicionless searches in Florida v. Bostick,120 even if police action is 
limited to circumstances that meet the original Terry requirements of 
objective evidence, police still have the power to make stops so long 
as they have a “reasonable, articulable basis to suspect of criminal 
wrongdoing.”121 The Dapolito decision simply emphasizes that police 
officers must meet these requirements before intruding on citizens 
and may no longer cut constitutional corners.122 
IV.  POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DAPOLITO DECISION 
At first glance, the Dapolito decision made no change to police 
powers under Terry stop law in the First Circuit. Police officers may 
still approach individuals as to whom they have reasonable suspicion 
and ask them incriminating questions.123 But Dapolito stands for the 
proposition that there should be a more assertive judicial review of 
officers’ testimony about what evidence gave rise to their suspicion. 
Under Dapolito, adequate objective evidence to support claims of 
reasonable suspicion is necessary to justify the intrusion into the 
individual’s life.124 
Of course, Dapolito is a circuit court decision and can only 
mandate change to the courts beneath it. But Dapolito may have 
 
 118. Id. at 24. 
 119. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 9.5(d) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 
11 (1989)). 
 120. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 121. Id. at 450 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 122. See United States v. Dapolito, 713 F.3d 141, 152 (1st Cir. 2013) (stating that there 
“simply cannot” have been reasonable suspicion on the facts of the case); see also United 
States v. Dapolito, No. 2:12-cr-00045-NT, 2012 WL 3612602, at *3 (D. Me. Aug. 21, 2012) 
(criticizing the officers for providing “conflicting testimony” about whether the search was 
conducted for protection or identification). 
 123. See Dapolito, 713 F.3d at 153 (“But where . . . the police did not have reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the defendant had been or was going to be engaged in a crime, 
the consensual inquiry (with which Dapolito complied) cannot be converted into an 
investigatory stop. The law requires this result.”). 
 124. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991). 
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persuasive impact on courts in other circuits125 and even on the 
Supreme Court itself. Changes in technology make privacy from 
government intrusion an even more significant concern than it was 
when Terry was decided five decades ago,126 and there is a sense that 
there has been mission creep in the judiciary’s attempts to promote 
preventative crime efforts.127 Recent events have cast doubt on the 
abilities of officers to self-regulate the constitutionality of their 
actions, and citizen-police tensions are high.128 Consequently, the 
nation is increasingly interested in a more thorough review of police 
action to limit officer power.129 The Dapolito decision reflects the 
 
 125. At least one other circuit has recently showed similar skepticism toward officers’ 
characterizations of suspicious activity. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 539 
(4th Cir. 2013) (“At least four times in 2011, we admonished against the Government’s 
misuse of innocent facts as indicia of suspicious activity.”). 
 126. The Supreme Court acknowledged the pervasive presence of technology and the 
ensuring expanded opportunities for government intrusion in citizens’ lives in Riley v. 
California. 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2488–89. In response to the government argument that searches 
of cell phone data are indistinguishable from searches of other physical items, the Court 
replied, “That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a 
flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies 
lumping them together. Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far 
beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.” Id. 
 127. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 7, at 424 (“[T]he Terry Court dismally failed to strike an 
adequate balance between effective law enforcement and individual freedom. The Court 
struck that balance completely in favor of the police, and the balance has been further 
tipped in favor of police by later Supreme Courts.”). 
 128. See Nicole Flatow, What Has Changed About Police Brutality in America, from 
Rodney King to Michael Brown, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 11, 2014, 9:34 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/09/11/3477520/whats-changed-and-what-hasnt-in-
policing-the-police/ (tracking the increased police militarization since the 1990s, and 
highlighting the “cultural disconnect” between citizens and police); Al Baker & J. David 
Goodman, Despite Scrutiny, Police Chokeholds Persist in New York City, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/nyregion/police-keep-using-
chokeholds-despite-bans-and-scrutiny.html (discussing public outrage after an officer 
killed a citizen by putting him in a chokehold and highlighting the questionable legality of 
some police action by claiming that “[e]ven in places where chokeholds are banned, 
officers sometimes simply fall back on what works”). But see Sunil Dutta, I’m a Cop. If 
You Don’t Want to Get Hurt, Don’t Challenge Me, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/19/im-a-cop-if-you-dont-want-
to-get-hurt-dont-challenge-me/ (recounting the “curses, screaming tantrums, [and] 
aggressive and menacing encroachments” an officer experienced while on patrol). 
 129. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Highway Seizure in Iowa Fuels Debate About 
Asset-Forfeiture Laws, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/investigations/highway-seizure-in-iowa-fuels-debate-about-asset-forfeiture-laws/2014/11/ 
10/10f725fc-5ec3-11e4-8b9e-2ccdac31a031_story.html (noting citizen skepticism of police 
officers’ motivations for traffic stops and highlighting the fear that “as long as police 
agencies know that all or some of the cash they seize will be funneled back into them, the 
roadside shakedowns are going to continue”); Frances Robles, Ferguson Sets Broad 
Change for City Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/ 
us/ferguson-council-looks-to-improve-community-relations-with-police.html (“The Ferguson 
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current feeling that courts should expand their review of officers’ 
interactions with citizens.130 In light of these circumstances, the 
Supreme Court may be persuaded to act more assertively to protect 
Fourth Amendment rights, even considering its general reluctance to 
insert the judiciary into the on-the-spot decisions of police on the 
streets. The Court would do well to remember Justice Douglas’ 
warning in his Terry dissent: “To give the police greater power than a 
magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path.”131 
There are some signs that the Supreme Court may be willing to 
join the turning tide on Fourth Amendment analysis. In a joint 
decision addressing Riley v. California132 and United States v. Wurie,133 
the Supreme Court held that police could not conduct a warrantless 
search of digital information on a cell phone seized from an arrested 
individual.134 Observers were surprised that the Court declined to 
 
City Council said Monday that it would establish a citizen review board to provide guidance 
for the Police Department.”); Dream Defenders, Petition: We Demand National Change to 
Protect Citizens and Communities from Police Violence and Misconduct, CHANGE.ORG, 
http://www.change.org/p/president-barack-obama-we-demand-national-change-to-protect-
citizens-and-communities-from-police-violence-and-misconduct (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) 
(demanding “transparency and accountability” among police departments). 
 130. One manifestation of this desire for greater police review is increased interest in 
police body cameras. These cameras could remove the inevitable “he said, she said,” 
element of post-incident testimony and could greatly enhance a court’s ability to 
determine if a police officer’s assessment was reasonable. See Can Body Cameras ‘Civilize’ 
Police Encounters?, NPR (Sept. 5, 2014, 3:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
alltechconsidered/2014/09/05/345784091/can-body-cameras-civilize-police-encounters 
(noting the increase in citizen demands for police body cameras to “provide a permanent 
video record of what happens during a police-citizen encounter”); see also Martin Kaste, Can 
Cop-Worn Cameras Restore Faith in New Orleans Police?, NPR (May 22, 2014, 5:38 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/05/22/314912840/can-cop-worn-cameras-
restore-faith-in-new-orleans-police (profiling the New Orleans Police Department’s use of 
body cameras as an attempt to “rebuild the public’s trust” and noting that cameras are 
“especially appealing to troubled police departments that are under federal scrutiny”). 
Indeed, in response to the “simmering distrust” between police departments and minority 
communities, President Obama proposed $263 million in funding for police body cameras 
and training. See Carrie Dann & Andrew Rafferty, Obama Requests $263 Million for 
Police Body Cameras, Training, NBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2014, 1:17 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/obama-requests-263-million-police-body-
cameras-training-n259161. The program would offer $75 million over three years, 
matching state funding by fifty percent. Id.  
 131. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas 
found even “reasonable suspicion” too great a deterioration of the probable cause 
standard and believed that any such weakening of the Fourth Amendment should come in 
the form of a constitutional amendment. Id. 
 132. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), rev’d 
and remanded sub nom. Riley v. California 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 133. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 
2473. 
 134. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495. 
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extend the rule of previous cases,135 which allowed police to search 
personal property found on the person of the arrestee,136 but instead 
found that the scope of information potentially revealed during a cell 
phone search was too great to allow for warrantless police access.137 
Indeed, the Court seemed to depart from the logic of its recent 
decision in King when it said that “[t]he fact that an arrestee has 
diminished privacy interests does not mean that the Fourth 
Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.”138 Most significantly, the 
Court explicitly recognized that its holding would impede officers’ 
efforts to fight crime.139 In recognizing that its decision would make it 
harder for law enforcement to learn incriminating information about 
“dangerous criminals,” the Court flatly acknowledged that “[p]rivacy 
comes at a cost.”140 This is a clear change in the tenor of the Court’s 
approach to Fourth Amendment analysis, and attentive observers 
might well have anticipated the Court would decide the cell phone 
issue in the exact opposite way, perhaps proclaiming that safety 
comes at a cost. 
Despite this positive development, it remains unclear whether 
the joint Riley and Wurie decision is the sign of a new trend in the 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence or whether it is 
an anomaly. The Court’s decision in Maryland v. King shows that the 
Court has not fully made up its mind regarding the balance between 
Fourth Amendment rights and the judicial deference necessary to 
accommodate the practicalities of police work. But with the cell 
phone cases, the Court has, at the very least, shown itself open to the 
argument that the balance has tilted too far in favor of the police and 
that it is willing to acknowledge that not all Fourth Amendment rights 
should be subsumed by deference to police action. 
 
 135. For an example of a Supreme Court observer who predicted a more law-
enforcement-friendly decision from the Court, see Orin Kerr, Initial Impressions from the 
Oral Argument in the Supreme Court Cell Phone Search Cases, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/29/ 
initial-impressions-from-the-oral-argument-in-the-supreme-court-cell-phone-search-cases/ 
(“If I’m right about where the Justices are, I suspect we may end up with some kind of 
middle-ground rule that says that some kind of warrantless cell phone searches are 
permitted incident to arrest . . . . I suspect they’ll find a way to say that the narrow search 
in Wurie (the flip-phone case) was allowed . . . .”).  
 136. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2477–78. 
 137. Id. at 2489 (“Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have 
received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or 
article they have read—nor would they have any reason to attempt to do so.”).  
 138. Id. at 2488. 
 139. Id. at 2493 (“We cannot deny that our decision today will have an impact on the 
ability of law enforcement to combat crime.”).  
 140. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Recent Supreme Court cases on Fourth Amendment issues show 
that the balancing act between the practical need for police 
investigation and the constitutional need for protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure has gone off-kilter. The Court’s 
deferential approach to officers’ testimony and its focus on the 
practical needs of police work have tipped the scales that were so 
carefully set in Terry,141 at the expense of the integrity of the Fourth 
Amendment.142 
In Dapolito, the First Circuit pushed back against this trend and 
reasserted the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens. The court 
engaged in skeptical review of police action and demanded objective 
evidence to support reasonable suspicion. With this decision, the 
court returned to Terry’s limited version of permissible pre-arrest 
police power. Similar to the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley, the 
First Circuit’s holding in Dapolito reflected less concern for the 
practical considerations of police work and greater concern for the 
Fourth Amendment. Dapolito is therefore a positive development in 
the field of Fourth Amendment rights, and courts that adopt its 
framework will do their part to ensure an even-handed balance 
between citizens’ rights and government claims. The First Circuit’s 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment rang true with the Court in 
Riley. Now the Court should follow Dapolito’s example and re-
evaluate its approach to Terry stop jurisprudence. 
CLAIRE R. O’BRIEN** 
 
 141. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“[F]or there is ‘no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search . . . against the invasion which a 
search . . . entails.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 536–37 (1967))). 
 142. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 288 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]hen the Court speaks of practicality, what it is really talking of is the continued 
ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens.”). 
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